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I. Introduction
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure ("doctrine") is a relatively new intellectual
property-related concept existing derivatively from and under the purview of traditional
trade secret law.' The doctrine holds that employees who possess knowledge of their
current employer's trade secrets will "inevitably disclose" those trade secrets as a con-
sequence of being hired for the same or similar job at a competitor of their current
employer.2 The legal concern as a consequence of this "inevitable" disclosure is misap-
propriation of trade secrets and its accompanying revelation of economically valuable
information to competitors. The Second Circuit has said, "[a] trade secret once lost is,
of course, lost forever."3 The doctrine, as with all of intellectual property law, evidences
the constant tension between public policy and economic incentive.4 The essence of that
tension lies in the complex judicial and legislative soul-searching that seeks to balance
the public policy ideal of expanding the intellectual knowledge and personal freedoms of
the country against the equally pressing capitalistic ideal of encouraging and rewarding
private economic investment made solely for proprietary gain.'
This paper discusses the doctrine and its potential effects on companies and people
in light of the potentially chilling effect of this new litigation tool. As stated by Edmund
W. Kitch, "In the information age, rights in information are as important a component
of the asset base of the successful corporation as are rights in tangible property."6
Part II of this Comment will explore the evolution of the doctrine and its current
state of being by touching upon various public, private, and judicial implications of the
doctrine. These implications are seen in the context of public policy (the physical and
intellectual freedom of workers), the private rights of employers (to develop and pro-
tect proprietary knowledge designed solely for economic advantage), and the doctrine's
practical application (the judicial outcomes that allow courts to impose ex post facto
1. See Nathan Hamlet, Note, The Impending Merger of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and
Neentive Trade Serrets t Trade Secret Lw -4n- ,,d t Digh Di;,,,-i,;.? 25 ]. COP L 383
384 (2000).
2. See, e.g., PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995). Pepsico is consistently
cited as the case in which the doctrine of inevitable disclosure matured as a judicial tool.
As discussed, infra, there are cases dating back as far as 1919 in which courts utilized the
term "inevitable" in the context of a potential employee trade secret breach. In PepsiCo, the
trial court fleshed-out the deeper implications of the doctrine and articulated the bases by
which the present analytical and judicial framework of the doctrine has evolved.
3. R. Mark Halligan, Threatened Misappropriation: The "Inevitable Disclosure" Doctrine, (1995),
available at http://www.execpc.coni/-'-iihallign/doctrine.htm (referencing FMC Corp. v.
Taiwan Tainan Gaint Indus Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)).
4. See id. (quoting PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) "[tlhis tension is
particularly exacerbated when a plaintiff sues to prevent not the actual misappropriation of
trade secrets but the mere threat that it will occur."). See also Ian N. Feinberg, Inevitable Dis-
closure of Trade Secrets: A New Problem for Companies Hiring Experienced Technical Workers,
available at http://www.gcwf.com/articles/interest/interest_5.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2001).
5. See, e.g., PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d at 1268. Trade Secret law exists to "encourage invention
and innovation" while at the same time protecting "the public interest in having free and
open competition in the manufacture and sale of unpatented goods."
6. Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion Of Trade Secrecy Protection And The Mobility of Manage-
ment Employees: A New Problem For The Law, 47 S.C. L. REV. 659, 663 (1996).
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restrictive covenants on the speech, mobility, and the freedom to work of departing
employees).7 Section A.1 of Part II will first review the model acts that serve as the bases
for the evolution of the common law of trade secrets, and then Section A.2 will discuss
the meaning of the doctrine in the context of its current use as an outgrowth of trade
secret law.
The historical roots of the doctrine in Federal and State trade secret law will then be
examined in Part II, Section B. This section will further review trade secret law and the
relatively recent evolution of the doctrine. While the doctrine is generally acknowledged
to have reached its modern expression in PepsiCo v. Redmond,8 the common-law roots
of the doctrine can be found as early as 1919.9 In fact, however, the doctrine has always
been implicit as an underlying premise of trade secret law from the most ancient days of
commercial trade.'
0
Part II, Section C, of this paper will review the current status of law related to
the doctrine and will look at some key cases that are representative of its evolution
and common-law application. Section C.1 will discuss PepsiCo v. Redmond" and its
significance as the archetype for contemporary application of the doctrine in a trade
secret misappropriation case. Section C.2 will also examine other significant cases before
and after PepsiCo that have played a role in the development of the doctrine.
The conclusion of Part II, Section D, entails an exploration of the doctrine in the
context of the employer/employee relationship. This section again explores the implica-
tions of the doctrine inherent in the tensions between public policy and private rights.
7. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 4, at 2.
8. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1263.
9. See Susan Street Whaley, Comment, The Inevitable Disaster of Inevitable Disclosure, 67 U. CIN.
L. REV. 809, 821 (1999). Whaley references Eastman Kodak Co. v. Power Film Prods., Inc., 179
N.Y.S. 325 (4th Dept. 1919). In Eastman Kodak, the court upheld a non-compete covenant
and, even while acknowledging that the employer had not established per se misappropriation
of trade secrets, believed he would inevitably use the knowledge of his ex-employer to the
benefit of his new employer. The court stated that "[t]he mere rendition of the services
along the lines of his training would almost necessarily impart such knowledge to some
degree. [The employee] cannot be loyal both to his promise to his former employer and
to his new obligations to the defendant company." See also Hamler, supra note 1, at 391;
Christopher B. Wells, The "Inevitable )isclosure Doctrine" Now Ready for Use as the "Inevitable
Injunction Tool'; available at http://www.lanepowell.com/news/insightsjan2000.htm; Fountain
v. Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp., 122 So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). In Fountain, a
temporary restraining order prohibiting the defendant from joining the plaintiff's competitor
was affirmed. The employee had signed an employment agreement inclusive of a one-year
non-compete clause. Despite only the threat of disclosure of trade secrets, the court affirmed
the injunction preventing the employee from joining the plaintiff's competitor.
10. See A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 837, 838-39 (1930). This article discusses misappropriation of slave labor in ancient
Rome. In ancient Rome, slaves formed the largest group of employees. When the competitor
of a slave owner (employer) enticed a slave (the employee) to reveal the employer's secrets,
the employer was entitled to legal action against the third-party who wrongfully induced the
slave to reveal the trade secret. Double damages were awarded against the third party that
had misappropriated the trade secret; penalties included any reduction in the value of the
slave as well as any other harm to the employer.
1t. See PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 E3d at 1262.
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Specifically, this exploration will develop the issue from the perspectives of both employ-
ers and employee through an examination of key employment related documents, includ-
ing non-compete agreements and non-disclosure agreements. These documents are the
most tangible expressions of the limitations inherent in the relationship between employ-
ers and employees. Finally, this section begins to discuss the effect of the doctrine on the
attitudes and approach of investors in technology companies, an industry that engenders
an exceptional amount of employee mobility.
Part III of this Comment explores the potential financial implications of the doctrine
on companies and people.'2 The application of the doctrine has created both business
uncertainties' 3 and judicial inconsistency, with the courts holding for and against the
doctrine as well as employing parts of the doctrine. 4 The ongoing evolution of the
doctrine, its strategic and tactical use by aggressive high technology companies,"5 and
investors' ever-present fear of litigation will be examined as to its impact on the attitude
of investors in risking substantial sums of money in start-up and emerging technology
companies.
The final section of this Comment will touch upon selected worker related issues,
including immigration issues, and the negative effects of the doctrine on the continued
growth of the country's most dynamic economic sector, the technology industry in its
myriad of forms. 6
12. See Jonathan Weil, Alcatel Unit is Quick to Sue Firms Hiring Its Employees, WALL ST. J., June 21,
2000, at TI, WL-WSJ 3033735.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 E3d 467 (lst Cir. 1995) (rejecting the inevitable dis-
closure doctrine); Uncle B's Bakery v. O'Rourke, 920 F.Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (holding
that a former bagel plant manager could not work for competitors within a 500-mile radius);
Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197 (D. Utah 1998) (limiting an
emnplnyee frorm taking a new Job for only nine months on the theory that his information
about his prior employer would be "stale" by the end of that period).
15. See Weil, supra note 12, at T1. See also Neal E. Boudette & Ann Davis, SAP Suit to Protect
Intellectual Property To Test Support For New Legal Theory, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1999, at B7A,
WL-WSJ 24927494.
16. The term "technology industry" in itself means nothing. The basic question of what con-
stitutes a technology company is worthy of a Comment-length paper. For example, General
Motors or Exxon are hugely technology driven whether it is in the manufacture of cars
or the drilling for or refining of oil. These companies are not only consumers of technol-
ogy but drivers of new technologies as well. The oil industry in particular has historically
been a leading edge industry in the development and use of technology. For example, Texas
Instruments in Dallas, one of the leading chip development and manufacturing companies in
the world, started its corporate existence as Geophysical Services, Inc., providing geophysical
(seismic) services to the oil industry. GM and Exxon, however, are not what are popularly
considered to be "technology companies." Texas Instruments, Intel, Cisco, Microsoft, and
Oracle are technology companies in the common usage of the term. But even at that, the
term is still misleading because it puts a homogeneous face on diverse and separate sectors
that independently exist under the umbrella of "technology industry." These diverse indus-
try sectors include huge industries in themselves such as software (including development
software, application software, and computer languages) desktop hardware and hand-held
devices, telecommunications (including, for example, wired and wireless devices, fiber optics,
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II. The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
A. DEFINING THE DOCTRINE
1. A Review of Trade Secrets and Uniform Acts
A trade secret is generally considered to be "something of value that is also secret."17
That "something of value" is not the absolute economic value of the trade secret to
its owner, but rather the relative commercial value of the secret to a competitor of the
owner.'" It is the responsibility and burden of the owner of information, considered to
be a trade secret, to act and to cause others to act in a manner that evidences their
belief that the information at issue is "something of value" and therefore must be kept
"secret."' 9
Trade secrets, however, need not be kept absolutely confidential. 2 The legally per-
missible level of disclosure of a trade secret by its holder is expressed in the Restatement
(First) of Torts (1939) as follows:
"He may, without losing his protection, communicate it to employees involved in its use. He
may likewise communicate it to others pledged to secrecy .... Nevertheless, a substantial
element of secrecy must exist, so that except by use of improper means, there would be
difficulty in acquiring the information."
21
Thus the holder of a secret can disclose proprietary information, for purposes of
furthering the "economic interests" of the holder, without having that information lose
and global positioning satellite (GPS) technologies), e-commerce applications and business
process models, Internet-specific hardware and software infrastructure technologies, and tech-
nology services such as web-hosting and data mining, and other third-party business out-
sourcing. All of these industries comprise the popular notion of the "technology industry,'
and, while under some grand unification theory all technologies are interdependent, these
various sectors have independent business and product development cycles and economic
valuations.
17. Whaley, supra note 9, at 813 (citing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION).
18. See id. at 814.
19. See id. (referencing Gale R. Peterson, TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN AN INFORMATION AGE
§2.1(B), at 2-9 & n.10 (1997)). Peterson points out that whether the actions of a given party
are legally sufficient to prove misappropriation is always going to be fact dependent. The
general factors that will be looked at by a court in determining whether the information was,
in fact, treated as a "trade secret" include the following:
* Taking reasonable precautions against industrial espionage.
* Marking plans and documents as "confidential".
* Use of "confidentiality" legends, warnings, and agreements.
* Restricting visitors and similar types of plant security.
• Locking up or otherwise securing otherwise sensitive information.
* Taking technical precautions, such as dividing the system into steps handled by different
individuals or departments.
* Copy protection and embedded codes to track copies.
* Employee exit interviews.
20. See Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1200 (5th Cir. 1986).
21. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §757 cmt. b (1939).
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its legal status as a trade secret. 22 Misappropriation occurs, however, if a party discloses
or uses another's trade secret without a privilege to do so.
23
Trade secrets are an essential part of the development of America's wealth of tech-
nology and intellectual property assets. -4 Trade secret law is an amalgam of state law
developed and adopted from uniform federal acts.25 Over the past fifty years, three dif-
ferent model federal acts have attempted to codify, for purposes of continuity in judicial
application, the definition of "trade secret." These model codes are: The Restatement
(First) of Torts §757, comment b, (1939),26 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (1979),27 and
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995).28 In addition to these common-
law related acts, Congress enacted the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 to codify penalties
for criminal misdeeds that lead to the appropriation of trade secrets by foreign govern-
ments. 29 A review of each of these acts will help provide insight as to how various courts
have reached their decisions in the trade secret cases discussed infra.
a. The Restatement (First) of Torts §757, comment b (1939)
Under the Restatement (First) of Torts:
"[one who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to
the other if ... his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the
other in disclosing the secret to him."3"
The term "trade secret" is defined in the First Restatement as consisting of any
"formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know
or use it. [I]t is not simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of
the business. A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the
business."'
'
Beyond this basic definition, which creates only theoretical guidelines ;s to what
may or may not be a trade secret, the Restatement reporters developed six factors to
serve as guideposts in determining whether a trade secret, in fact, exists.12 These factors
include the following: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the
employer's business; (2) the extent to which the information in dispute is known by
employees and others involved in the business; (3) the extent of measures taken by the
employer to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to
the employer and his competitors; (5) the amount of effort and money expended by the
22. See id.; see also Metallurgical Indus., Inc., supra note 20, at 1195.
23. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §757 cmt. c (1939).
24. See Hamler, supra note 1, at 383.
25. See Whaley, supra note 9, at 813.
26. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §757 cmt. b (1939).
27. See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (1979).
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995).
29. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. §1831 (1996).
30. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §757 (1939).
31. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §757 (1939).
32. See Whaley, supra note 9, at 814.
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employer in developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.3
With the exception of the first inquiry, no other factor is per se dispositive of the
question of whether something considered "secret" and "of value" has been adequately
protected by its owner. 4 The judicial inquiry as to whether trade secret protection is avail-
able thus engenders a "reasonable under the circumstances" type of analysis in which the
diligence of the owner in creating and enforcing these protections becomes the requisite
factual proof of the owner's belief in the information's "value" and need for "secrecy."35
The Restatement's basic definition of trade secret, in conjunction with the appli-
cation of these six inquiries, comprised the working definition for the courts of what
constituted a trade secret from 1939 through 1979.36 The six factors developed by the
reporters are still applied today even in jurisdictions where the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act has been adopted.
3 7
b. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) was published in 1979 after nearly ten years
of effort38 and was "designed to codify basic principles of common-law trade secret
protection."39 While the UTSA does not mention the theory of inevitable disclosure, it
does provide for injunctive relief based on a threatened or actual misappropriation of a
trade secret.4" The UTSA defines a "trade secret" as
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique,
or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts
that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
4
'
The UTSA has been adopted by over forty states and is considered to have substan-
tially expanded the scope and uniformity of what constituted both a trade secret and the
law protecting those secrets.
4 2
Under the UTSA, liability is found when a trade secret is used or obtained by
an "improper" means.43 The Restatement (Third), discussed infra, takes a similar
33. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §757 cmt. b (1939); see also Hamler, supra note 1, at 386
34. See Whaley, supra note 9, at 815.
35. See id.
36. See Hamler, supra note 1, at 386.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Pascal W. Di Fronzo, A Little Knowledge Is a Dangerous Thing 1 (1996), at http://www.ipmag.
com/difronzo.html.
40. See id.
41. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §1(4) (1979).
42. See Hamler, supra note I, at 387; see also Whaley, supra note 9, at 812; and Kitch, supra note 6,
at 659. Kitch notes that the sections of the Restatement related to trade secrets "provide
timely evidence that the United States is in compliance with Article 39 of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)."
43. See Whaley, supra note 9, at 815.
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approach.4 4 According to Kitch, Article 39 of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade "provide[s] legal pro-
tection for undisclosed information of private parties when disclosed or used contrary
to 'honest commercial practices. '  The implication of this approach is that trade
secret law embodies a standard of good faith and fair dealing between employee and
employer.46 This implied standard of good faith and fair dealing, however, does not
create an implied balance of power between these parties.47
c. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
In 1995, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition was drafted to provide
further guidance in defining trade secrets.48 In this Restatement, trade secret is defined as
"any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise
and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic
advantage over others."'4 9
Comment b to Section 39 of the Restatement evidences the intent of the drafters to
provide a definition of trade secrets consistent with that of the USTA.50 In contrast with
the Restatement (First) of Torts, there are three main differences in the definition of
"trade secret" between the UTSA and Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. These
differences are that under the UTSA and Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
(1) information does not have to be "in use"; (2) information can have "potential" value;
and (3) any valuable information qualifies, even if related to a "single"' or "ephemeral"
event.5 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition appears to have evolved as
a tightening of the broad-based definition of trade secret as promulgated by the UTSA.52
44. See id.
45. Kitch, supra note 6, at 660.
46. See id.
47. The use b, em.ploycr of ciloymenit-itelted agiI elts such as non-compete, non-
disclosure, and non-circumvention agreements immediately places the employee in a sub-
stantially subservient intellectual and physical position to the employer. The employee is
intellectually subservient because the employer now owns all of the employee's inventions
and perhaps even ideas. The employee is physically subservient because the employee may
find himself or herself prohibited from leaving their employment because of the threat of
litigation should new employment be sought. The imposition of the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure enabling employers to seek judicial remedies, even in the face of unenforceable
employment contracts or, alternatively, in the absence of contracts, puts the employee in an
even more tenuous position vis-i,-vis his or her future mobility to seek other employment.
48. See Hamler, supra note 1, at 387. See also Kitch, supra note 6, at 666. Kitch points out that
"The Restatement deals with remedies for particular breaches of confidence, but it does not
deal with the contractual relationships which created those obligations of confidence in the
first place.'
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §39 (1995).
50. See Hamler, supra note 1, at 387.
51. Id. See also Kitch, supra note 6, at 661.
52. See Hamler, supra note 1, at 388; see also Kitch, supra note 6, at 661. Kitch states that "the
expansion of the meaning of the term trade secret in the Restatement of Unfair Competition
follows the definition of trade secret in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act which has no such
limitation."
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d. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996
The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 was passed to provide federally sanctioned
criminal penalties for "economic espionage," i.e., misappropriation of trade secrets
that benefit a foreign government or its agents or instrumentalities.5 3 The statute also
addresses the issue of federal criminal penalties for domestic acts of misappropriation. 4
Section 1839 of the Act defines "trade secret" in the context of the criminal sanctions
imposed under the Act as follows:
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering infor-
mation, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, proto-
types, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically,
graphically, photographically, or in writing if-
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information
secret; and
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means
by, the public.55
The encompassing and intense nature of this language, and the evident desire by
the Congress to deter misappropriation of trade secrets by imposing criminal penalties
on offenders, sends a clear signal to employers that the federal government treats theft
of this nature seriously.5 6 As a result, it is likely that civil suits filed in state court, in
conjunction with the threat of possible criminal penalties in federal court, will likely
only increase the amount of litigation related to trade secret misappropriation, and give
rise to further expansion of the doctrine.5 7
2. The Meaning of the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure derives from trade secret law 58 and goes to
the essence of the tension between public policy that encourages commercial openness
and private rights that protect proprietary economic interests.5 9 In PepsiCo, the Seventh
Circuit stated:
[t]he question of threatened or inevitable misappropriation ... lies at the heart of a basic
tension in trade secret law. Trade secret law serves to protect 'standards of commercial moral-
ity' and 'encourage invention and innovation' while maintaining 'the public interest in having
free and open competition in the manufacture and sale of unpatented goods.'
60
53. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. §1839 (1996).
54. See id.
55. See id. §1839.
56. See EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR COM-
PETITION 446, 447 (5th ed. 1998).
57. See id. at 447.
58. See, e.g., Hamler, supra note 1, at 383; Feinberg, supra note 4, at 1.
59. See, e.g., PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268; Feinberg, supra note 4, at 1.
60. PepsiCo, 54 E3d at 1268 (quoting 2 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADER SECRETS LAW, §IL.01[7j
(Rev. Ed. 1994)).
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The doctrine requires a "real, actual, and substantial" threat that trade secrets will be
disclosed.6 Legally, the doctrine is implicated when employers fail to obtain contractual
agreements with their employees, through either a non-compete or general employment
agreement, inclusive of a non-disclosure covenant, either of which, or both, prohibits
the employee from disclosing the employer's trade secrets.6 2 Susan Street Whaley states
that the doctrine is
"[a]rguably the most important and influential development in the expansion of the law of
trade secrets, [because it] provides that even in absence of a non-compete or a non-disclosure
agreement, an employer can prevent an employee from working for a competitor when the
employee will "inevitably disclose" the employer's trade secrets."63
The application of the doctrine as a remedial legal tool64 is always fact depen-
dent on, inter alia, (1) whether the new employer is a competitor of the old employer;
61. See Peter E. Calamari & Michael A. Sirgado, Protection of Confidential Business Information,
1166 PRACTICING L. INsT. 41, 62 (2000).
62. See Arnold H. Pedowitz, Agreements that Restrict Competition: Advice From The Plaintiff's
Perspective-Legal and Ethical Issues, 625 PRACTICING L. INsT. 331, 370 (2000).
63. Whaley, supra note 9, at 810.
64. See Feinberg, supra note 4, at 1. In this article, Feinberg, a litigation partner in the Intel-
lectual Property & Technology Group of the Silicon Valley law firm of Gray Caiy Ware &
Freidenrich, LLP, discusses the implication of judicial remedies associated with the doctrine.
He states that the "seductive power" of the doctrine for over-worked and technically under-
educated judges enables those judges to avoid determining the nature of a plaintiff's technical
trade secrets. The avoidance of this complex threshold determination of whether there are
trade secrets, let alone whether the alleged trade secret at issue is, in fact, secret, precludes the
determination of whether the information has been misappropriated or is "threatened with
misappropriation." As a consequence, the "inevitable disclosure doctrine permits the entry of
a preliminary or permanent iniunction barring competitive work without any finding that the
former employer's secrets have been disclosed or are even threatened with disclosure:" Since
the judicial remedy in an inevitable disclosure case is likely to be an injunction preventing
an employee from working for a competitor of their prior employer, the inevitable disclosure
doctrine is the dark side of the law, precisely because it permits imposition of a judicially
imposed covenant not to compete in circumstance where the plaintiff did not obtain, or the
plaintiff could not obtain by contract.
This "ex post facto covenant not to compete not only bars the use of trade secrets but
also prevents the use of the defendant's general knowledge and skill." This prevention thus
"enjoins competitive work, not just the use or disclosure of trade secrets" and consequently
has to be seen beyond a mere "subspecies of threatened misappropriation." Feinberg notes
that the "power" of the doctrine is that it is a "remedy against competitive work and the
employee's inherent right to work' not against the disclosure of trade secrets. Furthermore,
the doctrine undermines the "tough burden" that has to bet met by a plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Under the Act, the plaintiff
must first prove the existence of a trade secret and then prove actual or threatened misap-
propriation. The term "misappropriation" means "that the defendant used 'improper' means
to obtain a trade secret, or knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was obtained
from someone who used improper means or who otherwise violated an obligation to main-
tain its secrecy or limit its use"; [u]nder the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the plaintiff need
not show even threatened misappropriation. And since an inevitable disclosure injunction
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(2) the scope of the defendant's new job; (3) whether the employee has been less than
candid about their new position; (4) whether the plaintiff has clearly identified the trade
secrets at risk; (5) whether the employee signed a non-disclosure and/or non-competition
agreement; (6) whether the new employer has a policy regarding the use of others' trade
secrets; and (7) whether it is possible to "sanitize" the employee's new position.6"
Absent written agreement, employers are looking to the doctrine to provide the pro-
tections the employer failed to obtain for itself.66 A finding of inevitable disclosure, and an
associated injunction to prevent the departing employee from working and/or disclosing
confidential information, thus becomes a judicially imposed ex post facto non-competition
agreement.67 This result subjects the employee to the terms and conditions of the injunc-
tion that could be potentially more malevolent in nature than had the employee simply
been bound by the terms of a written confidentiality or non-compete covenant.68
In fact, application of the doctrine could have the following effects: (1) preventing
the employee from working altogether and undermining a basic freedom of mobility;
(2) preventing the employee from working in their specific field of expertise, if they
are allowed to work at all; (3) putting the employee under a cloud of legal suspicion;
(4) inhibiting the legitimate growth of new employers through honest marketplace com-
petition for the best talent; and, perhaps most perniciously of all, (5) legally rewarding
the ex-employer through an imposed judicial mechanism for the operational or pol-
icy failures of their business. 69 Some courts have chosen to apply the doctrine on the
basis of actual or merely threatened misappropriation,7" while others have rejected the
very notion of the courtroom as being the appropriate place to provide after-the-fact
prevents competitive work, it does not require the court to determine what, exactly, the trade
secret is.
Feinberg concludes by stating that the trade secrets of former employers are over-
protected at the expense of the compelling public policy in favor of the right to work. The
doctrine is, for all practical purposes, an ex post facto covenant not to compete.
65. See D. Peter Harvey, "Inevitable" Trade Secret Misappropriation after PepsiCo Inc. v. Redmond,
537 PRACTICING L. INST. 199, 226-29 (1998).
66. See, e.g., Pedowitz, supra note 62, at 370.
67. See, e.g., Di Fronzo, supra note 39, at 1. Di Fronzo states that companies have argued that
inevitable disclosure is a "threatened misappropriation and that an injunction under the
USTA is an appropriate remedy. In response, others have argued that inevitable disclosure is
inconsistent with threatened misappropriation because granting an injunction for inevitable
disclosure amounts to an ex post facto covenant not to compete, which is contrary to the
intent of the drafters of the USTA, and because obtaining an injunction for threatened mis-
appropriation has historically required an intent to disclose trade secrets."
68. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 4, at 2. One of the ironies of the doctrine is that a court can
legally prevent an employee from going to work for a new employer whereas the ex-employer
may or may not be able to so bind the employee. The ex-employer's inability to restrict the
employee is a result of non-compete agreements that are often found to be unenforceable
because of excessive restrictions as to time, scope, and geography.
69. These outcomes, inter alia, would seem to be the least that could occur through an application
of the doctrine.
70. See, e.g., PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1272; Halligan, supra note 3, at 2.
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sanctuary for corporate negligence.7' Finally, the doctrine is implicated in the presence
of a written agreement that the ex-employer fears will be unenforceable in a manner
sufficient to prevent disclosure of its trade secrets to the new employer.7 -2
B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: THE ROOTS OF THE INEVITABLE
DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
As previously discussed, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure has its roots in trade
secret law.73 The essence of trade secret law relates to legal sanctioning of the need
of information owners to protect their proprietary intellectual knowledge, processes,
and workings of their tangible and intangible assets from misappropriation by current
and former employees.7 4 In attempting to achieve this objective, the doctrine found
expression in common-law cases as early as 1919."5 The early cases into which the doc-
trine could be imputed generally involved trade secret misappropriation, non-compete
agreements, and employees who had secretively stolen proprietary information from an
employer prior to termination.76 In 1966, the modern scope of classical trade secret
law evolved when the doctrine found expression absent a non-compete or employment
agreement.
77
In Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng'g Corp.,78 the plaintiff had
developed a fuel injection pump for diesel engines along with associated trade secrets
concerning manufacturing processes, heat treatments, and negative test results.79 The
substance of these trade secrets had also become known to an employee of the plaintiff
in the normal course of his employment.8" The employee, who had no employment or
non-disclosure agreement with the plaintiff, had the full run of the plaintiff's laboratory
for four years before leaving for employment with the defendant in a job that would
have entailed perfecting the defendant's fuel injection pumps."s The court observed that
two conflicting principals of law were operative, (1) an employee's freedom to contract
71. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d 467 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming the trial court
holding that public policy "counsels against unilateral conversion of non-disclosure agree-
ments into non-competitive agreements. If Campbell wanted to protect itself against the
competition of former employees, it should have done so by contract. This court will not
afford such protection after the fact"); see also Carolina Chem. Equip. Co. v. Muckenfuss,
471 S.E.2d 721 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that an employment related agreement enti-
tled "Covenant Not to Divulge Trade Secrets" was too broad to be enforceable because the
definition of trade secret could be construed in such a way as to prevent any competition
whatsoever by the ex-employee).
72. See, e.g., Pedowitz, supra note 62, at 370.
73. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 4, at 1; Whaley, supra note 9, at 810.
74. See, e.g., Hamler, supra note 1, at 384; Whaley, supra note 9, at 810.
75. See Whaley, supra note 9, at 821.
76. See Wells, supra note 9, at 1.
77. See id.
78. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D.
Mich. 1966); see also Harvey, supra note 65, at 205.
79. See id. at 646.
80. See id. at 650.
81. See id. at 647, 650-651.
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for work and "inevitably" use knowledge obtained on his prior employer's time at his
prior employer's expense, and (2) an employer's right to protect its trade secrets.8 2 The
court determined that while the mere threat of trade secret misappropriation was not
sufficient to warrant injunctive relief, a "substantial threat of impending injury" was
sufficient to effect judicial intervention to stave off misappropriation.83 The court held
that the employee could work for the defendant in the design of fuel injection systems,
but could not work on the particular type of pump in which the plaintiff had proven
the inevitability of disclosure of its trade secrets.
84
The issuance of an injunction preventing free employee mobility, absent contractual
binds between the parties for which there were settled judicial remedies, opened the
door for the inevitable evolvement of what is now known as the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure.
8 5
C. THE PRESENT STATUS OF TRADE SECRET CASE LAW
AND THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
1. PepsiCo v. Redmond
The legal theory underlying the doctrine, as applied to a trade secret misappro-
priation claim, was brought into full bloom in Pepsico v. Redmond, the case generally
acknowledged to be the leading modern expression of the doctrine. 6 In Pepsico, the U.S.
82. See id. at 652-53.
83. See id. at 654.
84. See id. The court wrote that it is "inevitable that some of the knowledge acquired while in
the former employment should be made available to the new employer, and courts will not
deprive the employee of the right to use the skill he developed through the years." Id. at 653.
The court went on to say, however, that "the virtual impossibility of [the employee] per-
forming all of his prospective duties for [the defendant] to the best of his ability, without in
effect giving it the benefit of [plaintiff's] confidential information, makes a simple injunction
against disclosure and use of this information inadequate." Id. at 654.
85. In addition to Allis-Chalmers, there are numerous examples of pre-PepsiCo cases in which
employment issues identical to those discussed in specific doctrine of inevitable disclosure
cases were adjudged. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App.
1963); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash and Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428
(Del. Ch. 1964); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967); Emery
Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q. 829, (S.D. Ohio 1978); Air Prod. and Chem., Inc. v.
Johnson, 215 U.S.P.Q. 547 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); National Starch & Chem. v. Parker Chem.,
530 A.2d 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987); Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir.
1992); FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'l, Inc., 677 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1982). In Varco, the court
held that absent restrictions against using or disclosing the trade secrets of his ex-employer,
the employee was in a position to cause the ex-employer a fear of irreparable injury. See
Varco, 677 F.2d at 505. The Court ordered the new employer from placing the employee in
a job that would cause "an inherent threat of disclosure or use of ... trade secrets.' Id; but
see IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98, 101 (D. Minn. 1992) in which the
court held that "in the absence of a covenant not to compete or a finding of actual or an
intent to disclose trade secrets, employees may pursue their chosen field of endeavor in direct
competition with their prior employer."
86. See PepsiCo, 54 E3d at 1262.
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District Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a preliminary injunction pre-
venting defendant Redmond from taking a new job with the Snapple drink division of
Quaker Oats, PepsiCo's arch competitor in the "new age" drink category.87 The Seventh
Circuit, in upholding the district court's preliminary injunction stated that "a plaintiff
may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that the defendant's
new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plaintiff's trade secrets."88
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Redmond's "intimate knowledge" of PepsiCo's
pricing, marketing, and distribution plans would cause him to inevitably disclose that
knowledge to Quaker Oats.89 In making its decision, the court upheld the factors used
by the trial court as being dispositive of the inevitability of disclosure of PepsiCo trade
secrets. These critical factors included: (1) the review of the new employer's policies as
to the use of other's trade secrets; (2) the candor of the employee in disclosing the new
job opportunity with the old employer; (3) the specific trade secret knowledge of the
employee; (4) the scope of the employee's new job; and (5) the occurrence of actual
trade secret misappropriation.
90
After examining these factors, the court affirmed the district court's grant of a pre-
liminary injunction prohibiting Redmond from assuming his new position with Snapple
for six months, and forever prohibiting him from disclosing PepsiCo trade secrets.9' The
court put particular emphasis on the fact that Redmond had, at times, outright lied to
PepsiCo and had in other instances been less than candid in disclosing the true scope of
his new duties with Quaker Oats.92
In dismissing Quaker Oats' and Redmond's protestations that Redmond would not
need to utilize PepsiCo trade secrets in his new job with Snapple, the court found that
PepsiCo had demonstrated the almost identical nature of Redmond's new and old jobs
proving the inevitability of disclosure of PepsiCo trade secrets.93 In affirming the trial
court's decision, the Seventh Circuit held the doctrine applied even in the absence of a
restrictive covenant. 94 The court stated: "PepsiCo finds itself in the position of a coach,
one of whose players has left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing team before the
big game."'
At the subsequent trial on the merits upon remand from the Seventh Circuit, the
district court entered a permanent injunction against Redmond from ever disclosing
PepsiCo trade secrets and from accepting employment with Snapple for six months.96 In
87. See id. at 1263.
88. Id. at 1269 (emphasis added).
89. See id. at 1269.
90. See id. at 1270. See also PepsiCo v. Redmond, 1996 WL 3965 (N.D. 111. 1996) (issuing the
permanent injunction and final judgment against Redmond, upon remand from the Seventh
Circuit).
91. See id. at 1272.
92. See id. at 1270.
93. See id. at 1271.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 1270.
96. See PepsiCo, 1996 WL 3965 at 33.
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its ruling, the court held that
"[tjhreatened misappropriation can occur when an employee who knows of his employer's
trade secrets is hired by a competitor to perform a job with similar duties. In such cir-
cumstances, the inevitable disclosure or use of the trade secrets by the employee in his new
job constitutes misappropriation or threatened misappropriation under the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act and under common law'
97
The decision in Pepsico gave modern voice to the ancient concept of actio servi
corrupti, and established the precedent upon which others seeking to prevent disclosure
of trade secrets or free movement of employees could rely.98
2. The Present Bounds of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
As might be expected, courts have ruled differently about the efficacy of applying
the doctrine. Some courts have seen the doctrine as a necessary tool to prevent mis-
appropriation of trade secrets. Other courts have refused to impose judicial restraints
on employee mobility as a result of the employer's own failure to negotiate appropriate
post-employment limitations. Still others have applied the doctrine in a limited fashion,
as an expedient tool to balance the needs of both parties. The following cases are rep-
resentative of the body of cases at large, and in the aggregate define the current state of
the various doctrinal positions related to inevitable disclosure.
At present, twenty-one states support the theory of inevitable disclosure.99 These
states include Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. Some of the court deci-
sions in these states did not use the term "inevitable" and so it is debatable whether these
states fully adhere to the concept of inevitable disclosure as common law doctrine.'t 0
a. A Random Sampling of Pro-Doctrine Cases'01
The pro-doctrine cases essentially hold that the ex-employee's disclosure of trade
secrets is either inevitable, or that the ex-employer had proven his legal burden as to
the necessity of requiring protection from trade secret disclosure by the ex-employee to
his or her new employer. The courts in which the doctrine has found favor invariably
look to specific facts of a case in order to justify the inherent conflict between the public
97. See id. at 18.
98. See Schiller, supra note 10, at 839.
99. Stephen L. Sheinfeld & Jennifer M. Chow, Protecting Employer Secrets and the "Doctrine of
Inevitable Disclosure,' 625 PRACTICING L. INST. 417 (2000).
100. Id.
101. As the section title indicates, the included list is a brief and random sampling of pro-,
anti-, and middle ground Inevitable Disclosure cases. Some other recent Pro-Doctrine cases
include: Southwestern Energy v. Eickenhorst, 955 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Ark. 1997), aff'd, 175
F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 1999); Dulisse v. Park Int'l Corp., No. 97 C 8018, 1998 WL 25158 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 9. 1998); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 140 Ohio App. 3d 260 (Ohio Ct. App.
2000); Temco Metal Prod. v. GT Dev. Corp., No. CIV. 99-755-KI, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6305
(D. Or. May 5, 2000).
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policy of employee mobility and the employer's right to protect its economically valuable
intellectual property interests. Examples of cases in which the doctrine was found to
be wholly or partially meritorious include: Uncle B's Bakery v. O'Rourke, which held
that a former bagel plant manager could not work for competitors within a 500-mile
radius;1'02 National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., in which the court cited
PepsiCo with approval while holding that the probability of disclosure outweighed the
probability of non-disclosure;" 3 Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Ser.,
Inc.,' holding that the Arkansas Trade Secrets Act allowed threatened misappropriation
to be enjoined; Strata Marketing, Inc. v. Murphy,' affirming that inevitable disclosure
was a theory available under Illinois law, and allowed a plaintiff to defeat the defendant's
motion to dismiss; and Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino,"6 in which the court held that the
employee's behavior was a substantial factor in its decision to uphold a non-compete
agreement.
b. A Random Sampling of Anti-Doctrine Cases'0 7
Courts that have held against the doctrine have consistently taken a stringent view
of any inhibitions on the mobility of workers to pursue their livelihood. These courts
have refused to allow the judiciary to become a de facto extension of the company, by
providing a common-law remedy for the failure of the company to adequately protect
itself against the highly foreseeable likelihood of employee departures.
Specific examples of cases that have held against the doctrine include IBM v. Bony-
hard 0 8 in which the appellate court in an unpublished opinion reversed a preliminary
injunction against the employee issued by the district court, and Campbell Soup Co.
v. Giles, °9 in which the court rejected the doctrine as a judicial remedy for the negli-
gence or oversight of the corporation in failing to attain non-compete covenants with
its employees. In Campbell Soup, the appeals court upheld the lower court ruling that
stated public policy counsels against unilateral conversion of non-disclosure agreements
into non-competitive agreements." 0
Other cases that have held against the doctrine include a Texas case, Maxxim " lvled.,
Inc. v. Michaelson, in which the district court applied California law and found that
102. See Uncle B's Bakery v. O'Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
103. See National Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1997).
104. 987 S.W.2d 642 (Ark. 1999).
105. See No. 1-99-2749, 2000 WL 1800474 (Il1. App. Ct. Dec. 6, 2000).
106. 905 F Supp. 1205 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
107. Some other recent Anti-Doctrine cases includes: Danjaq, LLC v. Sony Corp., No. CV 97-8414-
ER MCX, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22486 (C.D. Cal. March 11, 1999); Computer Sci. Corp.
v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc., No. CV 98-1374-WMB, SHX, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21803
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1999); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 148 F. Supp.
2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Government Tech. Serv., Inc. v. Intellisys Tech. Corp., No. 160265,
1999 Va. Cir. LEXIS 502 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 20, 1999).
108. 962 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1992).
109. 47 F.3d 467 (1st Cir. 1995).
110. See id. at 472 (affirming the trial court's ruling that the courts should not protect a company
simply because it failed to do so for itself).
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under the PepsiCo factors, disclosure and misappropriation of trade secrets by the defen-
dant were inevitable."' The Fifth Circuit in an unpublished opinion overturned this
decision." 2 In EarthlWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, the court refused to expand a bargained-for
non-compete agreement by allowing the inevitable disclosure doctrine to be become a
de facto restrictive covenant." 3
c. Balanced Application of the Doctrine".4
Certain courts have split the difference between refusing to find merit in the doc-
trine and treating the doctrine as a legitimate judicial remedy. The courts that split
the difference find merit in the basic idea of inevitable disclosure, but attempt to bal-
ance that finding with equity that acknowledges the structures of public policy as to
employee mobility. Cases that have taken this middle position include Merck & Co. v.
Lyon," 5 in which the court enjoined the employee from discussing his former employer's
products and pricing for two years, but refused to enjoin the employee from joining
his new employer absent a showing of bad faith. Another case, Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos
Research Group,"6 limited an employee from taking a new job for only nine months on
the theory that his information about his prior employer would be stale by the end of
that period. Yet another approach to the issue is found in Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular
Sys., Inc.," 7 in which the court denied a preliminary injunction prohibiting the employee
from taking a new job, but also prohibited the employee from making disclosures of
proprietary information. Additionally, the court granted Bayer the right to periodic and
"unobstructed" discovery to insure compliance with the prohibition.
As can be seen by these widely varying outcomes and opinions in all three sub-
sections, courts have viewed the doctrine in many ways, and future application of the
doctrine will likely remain as varied as past application.
D. THE INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
1. Background
The most critical intellectual property issue surrounding the doctrine relates to the
protection of trade secrets within the context of the employee/employer relationship."'
111. See Maxxim Med., Inc. v. Michaelson, 51 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
112. See Maxxim Med., Inc. v. Michaelson, 182 F.3d 915 (5th Cir. 1999).
113. See EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
114. Other cases that have both used and rejected aspects of the Doctrine include: Aetna Retire-
ment Serv., Inc. v. Hug, No. CV 970479974S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1781 (Conn. Super.
Ct. June 18, 1997); APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa 1997);
International Paper Co. v. Suwyn, 966 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); PSC, Inc. v. Reiss, II1
F. Supp. 2d 252 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); Conley v. DSC Comm. Corp., No. 05-98-01051-CV, 1999
Tex. App. LEXIS 1321 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Feb. 24, 1999) (not designated for publication
under Tex. R. App. P. 47.7. Unpublished opinions may not be cited as authority).
115. 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
116. 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197 (D. Utah 1998).
117. 72 F. Supp. 2d 111 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
118. See Whaley, supra note 9, at 816.
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Absent legal protection against employees directly using or inadvertently revealing trade
secrets, the incentive of employers to make investments in developing economically valu-
able trade secrets that provide market advantages would likely become problematic." 9
To justify the capital expenditures needed to develop its business, process, and "insti-
tutional knowledge,' the employer must believe it is secure in its legal position, and that
those entrusted with the enterprise's most valuable secrets are precluded from arbitrarily
revealing or outright misappropriating those secrets. 12 The doctrine is also implicated
in a more insidious way because of employment market conditions.' 2 ' According to
Christopher Wells, "Businesses recruiting top talent in a hot market ... face the risk that
asking a potential star to sign a non-compete agreement may repel the prospect, who
will then join a competitor that does not require it -22
Thus, incredibly, employers may now look to the courts to both create and enforce
contractual agreements, in the form of either non-compete or non-disclosure arrange-
ments, that the employer failed to obtain in the ordinary course of its business and that
the presumably free employment marketplace itself may have rejected as too restrictive
in nature.'
23
The imposition of judicial remedy as the final arbiter between employer needs and
employee freedom undermines, if not outright upsets, the delicate policy tensions long
balancing the freedoms and rights of each party.124 The insidiousness of this judicial
imposition is that the courts are providing a remedy for employer failure to contractually
119. See Vikas Bajaj, Alcatel Guards Its Trade Secrets, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 3, 2000, at
1H. Bakaj references commentary from the subject of his article, George Brunt, senior vice
president and general counsel of Alcatel USA, one of the most aggressive proponents of
the use of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure to prevent departing Alcatel employees from
using Alcatel trade secrets in their new job. Bakaj states that "[clompanies won't have an
incentive to develop new technologies if employees can take those creations to the market forthemseives or a start-up veniure." See supti -,- ---- note 6, 
ULN)IALI, at UUM. ISM LII.,
"[there] are employees who are privy to information about the plans and strategies of the firm,
information that is not used continuously in the business because it is constantly changing, but
information that is of economic value to competitors because they can use it to adapt and modify
their own strategies."
120. See Whaley, supra note 9, at 816; see also Kitch, supra note 6, at 664. Kitch states that, his-
torically, trade secret issues related to the knowledge of ex-employees concerning "methods
of production" or "information about the identity and requirements of regular customers of
the ex-firm." Information about the ex-firm's "strategic plans, the identity of its most prof-
itable lines of business, and its internal operational problems were not trade secrets." While
such information "was confidential, an employee could not properly provide it to persons
outside the firm while still employed." Kitch goes on to say that while "such information was
not used regularly and repetitively in the business," once the employment terminated, such
information "formed part of the employee's general stock of knowledge about the industry
which he was free to employ elsewhere."
121. See Wells, supra note 9, at 3.
122. Id.
123. See Feinberg, supra note 4, at 4.
124. See id.
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restrict employees as one more form of required self-protection of its secrets. 21 In a
sense, given the strictures of all of the model acts, as well as case law, in demanding
that employers take all necessary and reasonable steps to protect their trade secrets, it
could be said that failure to legally contract with employees to respect the bounds of
knowledge and disclosure is, itself, a form of contributory negligence to the employers
own professed damages.
26
While the legal questions surrounding an allegation of trade secret misappropriation
are generally ones of fact, the deeper question being addressed by courts in deciding
cases involving the doctrine goes to the contending issues of property rights protection
and employee mobility, with its associated freedoms to seek the best work and best
pay.127 According to Michael Epstein, a trade secret litigator practicing in New York,
"[g]enerally the law promotes employee mobility. However, as courts become more pro-
tective of intellectual property it's appropriate for businesses to push the law. '  Likewise,
in an interesting pro-doctrine pro-business statement that cleverly aligns the interests of
remaining employees with those of the employer charging trade secret misappropriation
against one of their previous colleagues, "[it's not just the company, but you're also
talking about protecting the employees who work there. To allow a trade secret to walk
out of a company, to me, would lessen the value of the employees who are dedicated to
that company."'
129
In contrast to the above-stated perspective, courts "traditionally have emphasized
that employee mobility and freedom must be protected and favored over the employer's
protection of its trade secrets."'30 Kitch states that "one could reasonably conclude that
it is the usual expectation of employees that they are free to quit their jobs and seek
employment elsewhere, using whatever they have happened to learn on their previous
job or jobs."''
With the judicial maturation of the doctrine, Whaley states, "some courts that pur-
port to be protecting the important value of trade secrets are actually restricting compe-
tition and preventing employee mobility in a way contrary to the traditional approach
taken by many courts"132 As stated by Ian Feinberg, "[t]he mere threat of an inevitable
125. See id.
126. This is the author's own opinion.
127. See Weil, supra note 12, at Ti. "[I]f Alcatel's inevitable disclosure argument prevails, 'it means
that you're an indentured servant to any company you start with'-and that could stifle
innovation" (quoting Mark Bluhm, President and Chief Executive Officer, Navarro Networks,
Inc., Richardson, Texas). The implications of this statement come to rest in the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibition against indentured servitude, a topic outside the scope to this paper
but nonetheless implicit in all applications of the doctrine.
128. See Boudette & Davis, supra note 15, at B7A (quoting Michael A. Epstein, Attorney, New
York).
129. Weil, supra note 12, at T2 (quoting Gary Solomon, Attorney, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Dallas,
Texas).
130. Whaley, supra note 9, at 811.
131. Kitch, supra note 6, at 666.
132. Whaley, supra note 9, at 811. The "traditional approach" that Whaley is referring to is the
historical approach to trade secret protection that when an employee departed for another
employer courts enjoined that employee from disclosing the trade secrets of his or her prior
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disclosure injunction can result in a decision not to hire an employee of a competitor,
chilling employee mobility."'33
2. Employer/Employee Contractual Agreements
There are various contractual agreements that can exist between an employer and
employee.13 4 The most critical agreements that govern the scope of the relationship
between the employer and employee, and control the secrecy or revelation of trade
secrets, are non-compete and non-disclosure agreements.13s
a. The Non-Compete Covenant
Non-compete covenants are post-employment covenants that effectively extend trade
secret law by prohibiting the subject of the covenant from competing with his or her prior
employer for a period of time, generally one to two years. 136 Whereas trade secret law
prohibits the disclosure of the ex-employer's valuable secrets, the non-compete covenant
"block[s] the mechanism by which the spillover occurs."' 37 In other words, the employee
cannot even go to work for a competitor let alone disclose the ex-employer's secrets. 3
The non-compete covenant assures that, given the passage of time, when the employee
does return to work in the field of endeavor in which the trade secret exists, the trade
secret knowledge of the employee will be rendered moot and the employee will bring
only "her general and industry-specific human capital."'39
As a general rule, employees who are not subject to non-compete agreements are
free to seek employment at a competitor of their prior employer. 40 Regardless of this
employer. With the development of the doctrine, courts have gone substantially beyond tra-
ditional injunctive prohibition of trade secret disclosure. These courts have imposed the far
more punitive remedies on departing employees such as prohibiting them from working in a
job intmimately correlative with their prior employment, or, in some cases, even from accepting
any employment with the new employer.
133. Feinberg, supra note 4, at 2.
134. See, e.g., Sheinfeld & Chow, supra note 99; Pedowitz, supra note 62, at 350. Employment
agreements that can be formed between employer and employee include confidentiality, non-
competition, non-solicitation, and invention agreements. Generally, non-competition agree-
ments with restrictive employment clauses are what wind up being litigated.
135. See Whaley, supra note 9, at 817.
136. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U.L. REv. 575, 603 (1999).
137. Id. at 602.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 603. Gilson points out that not only will employer-specific information have been ren-
dered valueless over time, but the value of inchoate inventions the employee has strategically
chosen not to bring to conception during her employment, will have dissipated over the
covenant's term. Nothing of value is left to spill over to a new employer or start-up venture.
Gilson's analysis is similar to the reasoning of the court in Novell Inc. v. Timpanogos Research
Group, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197 (D. Utah 1998). In that case, the court limited an employee from
taking a new job for only nine months, on the theory that information about his prior
employer would be stale by the end of that period.
140. See Pedowitz, supra note 62, at 359.
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freedom, however, the employee is still prohibited by common-law from revealing the
trade secrets of the ex-employer in the desire to gain competitive advantage. 4' Should the
employee breach his "duty of loyalty" to his ex-employer to not reveal trade secrets,
the employer and/or new employee can be enjoined and damages may be awarded.' 4 2
Jurisdictions that uphold covenants not to compete will review, inter alia, the following
factors to determine the validity of a given covenant: (1) whether there is a legitimate
interest on the part of the employer in preventing the employee from competing with its
interests; (2) whether the agreement is reasonable given an "all the circumstances test;"
(3) whether the agreement is reasonably limited in time and geography; and (4) whether
enforcement would cause undue burden or harm to the public.'43
b. The Non-Disclosure Agreement or Covenant
Non-disclosure agreements are designed to prevent employees from disclosing infor-
mation deemed by the employer to be secret. 4 4 The terms of such agreements generally
include a promise by the employee to maintain confidentiality, a definition of what the
employer deems to be confidential, and a promise by the employee to return any written
information in the employee's possession to the employer upon termination."'
The limitations of non-compete and non-disclosure agreements define the scope
of the relationship and the duties between the employer and employee. As with any
contract that is freely negotiated,'46 employment-related documents are neutral in their
day-to-day legal effect until such time as an actual or threatened breach of duty or breach
of contract occurs. Under the doctrine, the standard of a threatened breach has been
lowered, and the employer need only plead the "mere threat" of disclosure, let alone its
"inevitability."'47
Inevitability, however, is not an equivalent concept or synonym for threat. In so
lowering the judicially settled concept of threatened breach, to a state where a simple
fear of trade secret disclosure is sufficient to obtain judicial intervention and possible
relief, the employer/employee bond can quickly turn into a noose."'
141. See id. at 360.
142.. See id.
143. See id. at 362.
144. See Sheinfeld & Chow, supra note 99, at 422.
145. See id. at 443.
146. 1 am making the assumption that the terms of the employment contracts have been freely
negotiated and that these contracts, in whole or in part, are not either per se illegal under
the laws of a given state nor are adhesion contracts.
147. See, e.g., Halligan, supra note 3, at 2; Feinberg, supra note 4, at 2.
148. See, e.g., Weil, supra note 12, at TI; Boudette and Davis, supra note 15, at B8A. See also Miles
J. Feldman, Comment, Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable Information: Trade Secrets
and the Employment Relationship, 9 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 152, 178 (1994). Feldman points out
that "[a] majority of courts will enforce a covenant restricting an employee from competing
with a former employer so long as it is reasonable in scope, territory, and duration, and is
necessary for the protection of the employer."
668 Law and Business Review of the Americas
II. Investment and Worker Issues in the Context of the
Doctrine
A. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE DOCTRINE ON INVESTMENT
According to Ronald J. Gilson, the rise of Silicon Valley as the key center of tech-
nology in the U.S. is directly related to the legal structure in California that engenders
freedom of mobility of workers to move from established firms to start-ups. 4 9 This
freedom is exemplified in that "California does not enforce post-employment covenants
not to compete."' 5 Specifically, Gilson comments that the doctrine of inevitable disclo-
sure "threatens just the type of knowledge spillover that has been so critical to Silicon
Valley." 5 Gilson concludes his analysis of the doctrine by stating that California's reluc-
tance to judicially impose the doctrine should be maintained: "Given the uncertainty
of the theoretical tradeoff between fully protecting property rights and protecting the
agglomeration economy that supports the industrial district, courts should be reluctant
to alter the legal infrastructure that preserves the existing, and successful, balance."'
5 2
In another expression of this same concern as to the chilling effects of the doctrine
on the transfer of knowledge, venture capitalist Jon Bayless, general partner of Sevin
Rosen Funds of Dallas, Texas, says that lawsuits involving application of the doctrine
will make aspiring entrepreneurs more hesitant to develop start-ups, thus inhibiting
venture funding opportunities and economic development.' 3 In discussing an inevitable
disclosure-based lawsuit filed against Chiaro Networks Ltd., a company funded by Sevin
Rosen, Bayless states, "I know of numerous examples where employees would have left
and started companies, but were too afraid of getting sued."' 54 Further, according to
Ken Lewis, Chief Executive Officer, Chiaro Networks, Ltd., Richardson, Texas, "if this
trend (the filing of inevitable disclosure lawsuits) continues, this is not the right kind
149. See Gilson, supra note 133, at 602. In this article, Gilson compares the legal infrasinuctures of
California with that of Massachusetts, where covenants not to compete are enforced. Gilson's
theory is that the enforcement of non-compete clauses "have the potential to restrict seriously
the movement of employees between existing firms and to start-ups and, hence, to restrict
seriously employee-transmitted knowledge spillovers:' The enforcement of these covenants,
and the resultant restriction of employee mobility, is directly responsible, in the case of Mas-
sachusetts, for the decline of the once thriving "industrial district" of Route 128. By contrast,
California's "legislative efforts ... provide the proper conditions for the development of high
technology industrial districts." In the most stark proof of premise, that the freedom of
employee mobility facilitates the growth or inhibition of high-technology industrial districts,
Gilson references data that shows that in 1990, Silicon Valley exported $11 billion worth of
electronic products compared to Route 128's exports of $4.6 billion. By 1997, however, San
Jose exported $29.06 billion (just behind New York with $29.08 billion) while the Boston
area came in twelfth with $8.7 billion of exported goods.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 624. Gilson points out that "li]t is because of the very character of tacit knowledge
that an employee cannot avoid its use.'
152. Id. at 626.
153. See Weil, supra note 12, at TI.
154. Id.
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of atmosphere to foster another Silicon Valley here [Richardson, Texas] in the Telecom
Corridor."'
Echoing Lewis, Ian Feinberg states, "the mobility of engineering and other technical
employees has been critical to the success of many technology companies in Silicon
Valley and elsewhere, particularly new start-up companies." '56 Feinberg states that:
[t]he mere threat of an inevitable disclosure injunction can result in a decision not to hire
an employee of a competitor, chilling employee mobility. For the same reason, widespread
application of the doctrine could adversely affect the creation of new companies by people
who are disenchanted with their present employer, or who think they have invented a better
mousetrap."' 7
Feinberg concludes his article by stating the following:
"[tlhe inevitable disclosure doctrine has the potential to chill Silicon Valley's explosive growth.
If an employee chooses a job at another firm in his field of expertise, it is likely that his
new job will be similar to his old job. But under the theory of inevitable disclosure, the
employee can be enjoined from using his or her non-trade secret, general knowledge and
skills to give the ex-employer adequate assurance that its trade secrets are not at risk. In
such circumstances, a start-up could be left with a ruinous, judicially created covenant not
to compete."'
58
One of the most aggressive companies in employing this doctrine is Alcatel USA, a
Paris, France company with American operations in Piano, Texas.' 59 The driving force
behind Alcatel's almost artful pursuit of potential employee malfeasance has been George
Brunt, senior vice president and general counsel of the company. 6 ° Brunt assumes a
take-no-prisoners approach to the protection of Alcatel's intellectual property assets:
"[ijf someone robbed $50 from a bank, the punishment would be very severe-they
would probably do time in prison. But people rob billions from companies big and
small through intellectual property, because we haven't conceptualized the value of an
intangible idea yet in our society."''
In a well-publicized case of its aggressive protection of its trade secrets, Alcatel sued
an ex-employee in 1997, charging that the employee had withheld an idea for a software
program conceived while still an employee of Alcatel. 62 On January 19, 2000, a state
district judge in Texas ruled that the employee must disclose to Alcatel the idea, which
had never been written down. 63 As punishment to the employee, the judge awarded
Alcatel 20 percent of the idea, even though the ownership of the idea itself was in
155. Id. at T3.
156. Feinberg, supra note 4, at 1.
157. Id. at 2.
158. Id. at 4.
159. See Bajaj, supra note 116, at 1H.
160. See id. Vikas Bajaj, Ownership of Ideas at Heart of Court Case, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug.
10, 2000 at ID.
161. Id.
162. See Bajaj, supra note 157, at ID.
163. See id.
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dispute, and no one knew whether or not the idea even worked.'64 The ownership of
the remaining 80 percent will be determined by a trial.'65 The stakes and risks are high
according to Brunt, "[i]f it [the computer software program] is what [the employee] said
it is, it will be one of those ideas worth billions of dollars. We don't know. It could be
worthless."'66
Mr. Brunt says that he is not looking to stop new technology development, but
cannot abide the effective conversion of Alcatel assets by competitors through the hiring
of Alcatel employees.'67 According to Brunt, "[i]t's a race, and as long as that race is fair,
great, but ... these people are starting near the finish line."'68
Needless to say, the recipients of Alcatel's lawsuits feel differently. According to
Dallas-based venture capitalist Jon Bayless:
"[Alcatel is] using their legal strategy as a competitive weapon, and in some cases they are
justified, and in others they are not. They don't seem to be able to differentiate between
where they have merit and don't have merit."
1 69
Not to be dissuaded, Brunt counters that:
"[p]eople ascribe all sorts of motivation to our intellectual property litigation. But the real
motive is that we are required by law to be vigilant in protecting our intellectual property,
and it's the underpinning of the whole business."'
70
It is difficult to determine where the deep tension between application of the doc-
trine, worker freedom, and investor comfort in investing in start-up companies in a
high-employment, litigious market will settle. As stated by Susan Scafidi, professor of
intellectual property law at Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University in
Dallas, Texas, "I am concerned that a legal strategy such as Alcatel's will have a chilling
effect on innovation. It may be good strategy from Alcatel's perspective, but not a good




On October 3, 2000, Congress passed the so-named High Tech Visa Bill. 72 Under




167. See Bajaj, supra note 116, at 5H. Alcatel's chief concern is with its ability to unveil products
before a start-up staffed by former employees does. That is, if a competitor or venture
capitalist gets access to pre-production secrets and Alcatel engineers, Alcatel fears the start-up
has the opportunity to dominate its chosen market(s).
168. Id.
169. Id. Chiaro Networks Ltd. and Monterey Networks were both funded by Sevin Rosen and are
both the subjects of lawsuits by Alcatel.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Lizette Alvarez, Congress Backs Big Increase in Visas for Skilled Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
2000 at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/l0/04/technology/04VISA.html.
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H-lB visas a year to foreign-born workers with college degrees and special skills. 73 These
work visas are good for six years although they are reviewed after three.'74 In the past
three years, the number of H-B1 workers permitted in the United States has tripled from
65,000.1'7
The Congressional vote passing the High Tech Visa Bill was 96 to 1 in the Senate
and a voice vote in the House. 7 6 The bill was written and passed in direct response to
the needs of the high tech industry, which is woefully short of the required number of
specially trained workers, in particular, computer programmer, and software engineers.
According to Representative David Drier (R. Ca.), "[t]here are 300,000 jobs that have yet
to be filled."'77 Then Senator Spencer Abraham (R. Mich.) echoed the problem:
[t]he one thing on which I think almost everyone is in agreement, is that we face a seri-
ous worker shortage with respect to high-tech employment and skilled labor in America
today. The short-term problem is how to fill the key positions immediately, so we don't lose
opportunities to foreign competitors. " 8
According to Harris Miller, president of the Information Technology Association of
America, a technology industry trade group:
"companies frequently use these people for computer programming jobs and creating new
software that can be used in a global environment. Is 195,000 going to be enough? But 115,000
wasn't nearly enough. The new economy is simply growing much faster than anybody ever
projected."7 9
These issues become even more problematical in light of Kitch's observation that:
"Itihe expansion of trade secrecy protection to encompass all confidential information
increases the range of employees who are subject to an obligation not to make that
information available to a new employer."'80
Kitch goes on to state that "[t]he expanded scope of trade secrecy protection afforded
by the Restatement brings a new class of employees within the ambit of its prohibi-
tions."'
The implication of more jobs than workers, combined with a litigious environment
driven by the fear of employers as to the vulnerability of their intellectual property, does
not bode well for enhanced employee mobility.12 The tender balance between employee
173. See id. at 2.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 3. In 1998 Congress increased the annual limit on the number of H- B visas from
65,000 to the current expected issuance of 195,000 per year.
176. See id. at 1.
177. Id. at 2.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 3.
180. Kitch, supra note 6, at 664.
181. Id. at 665.
182. See Feldman, supra note 145, at 182. Feldman writes that "[e]mployees who have signed
confidentiality contracts may discover that potential new employers are skittish about hiring
them because they fear litigation. For example, an employee with a confidentiality agreement
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mobility and employer protections as to investments in technologies and know-how is
clearly tipped at present in the favor of the employer.
IV. Conclusion
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure is of serious concern to investors, companies,
and employees. On a going forward basis, the inevitable disclosure doctrine looks to be
an even more ominous tool than it has been to date. If continuously utilized by the
courts to impose legal employment conditions that independent parties did not bargain
and contract for, the doctrine will have a detrimental effect on the growth of the coun-
try's vital technology sector. The likely effects of this judicial imposition into the realm of
private business contract will be a reduction in investment in new and growing compa-
nies, a diminishment in the number of start-up enterprises, decreased employee freedom,
and increased costs to current employers. On top of the business issues, Constitutional
issues related to Thirteenth Amendment proscriptions against indentured servitude lurk
not too far in the background.
The combination of these conditions will engender slower and more deliberate
decision-making on the part of investors and will directly impact the mobility and free-
doms of workers and the growth of concentrated and efficient high technology centers.
The potential slowdown in investment in new companies, technologies, and people over
time, at least in theory, could have a critical deleterious effect on the growth of the
technology industry, and the consequent health of the overall economy.
with Microsoft, will not be an attractive hire to a company with a small litigation budget,
because Microsoft has a legal department of over fifty lawyers and a reputation for aggressive
litigation.'
